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Introduction

In the 18 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the early hopes that the Central Asian state of Kazakhstan would establish a democratic political system have long faded. Rather, Kazakhstan has developed a durable form of authoritarianism. Literature specific to Central Asia suggests cultural legacies of kinship identities and familial bonds based on clan relations are major factors explaining authoritarian political development and the lack of democratization in the region. This clan politics approach argues that the appearance of informal political norms originate from cultural path dependent processes.​[1]​ The approach is correct to point to the importance of informal politics in explaining authoritarian consolidation, yet it overstates the case for kinship bonds and familial ties as the central driver. Too much emphasis is placed on a deterministic cultural explanation which undervalues the role played by the uncertainty that is apparent during transitions as an explanatory factor for the surfacing of informal politics and its influence on non-democratic outcomes. 

This article seeks to review and go beyond the clan politics approach when accounting for the origins of informal practices and organizations in Central Asia as a means to understand non-democratic durability. It uses an actor-oriented approach that emphasizes agency interest and choice in relation to the dynamic and uncertain context apparent at critical junctures of institutional change as a way to explain the prevalence of informal politics and authoritarian consolidation. Informal political norms of behaviour and relations derive, therefore, from a fusion between structural and cultural legacies and the dynamic and uncertain context of transition. Central Asian political development has been subject to a series of punctuated critical junctures throughout history which at each point witnessed a synthesis and combination of influences. Traditional patrimonial relations fused first with Tsarist administrative rule, then with Soviet bureaucracy and more recently with new formal liberal constitutional and legal-rational institutions.​[2]​ This article applies this understanding of informal political norm evolution by assessing the case of Kazakhstan’s early transition period (1991-1995). By looking back at this formative period we can determine two important issues: the emergence of informal politics as a consequence of uncertain and contingent processes and the central role of informal politics in shaping transition paths and contributing to authoritarian consolidation. 

In examining the early post-Soviet period in Kazakhstan (1991-1995) this article explores how, when faced with the uncertainty engendered by institutional conflict, emerging pluralism and electoral competition, the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, used the informal politics of patronage and patron-client exchange to stabilize his political rule and consolidate an authoritarian regime. The article begins by considering and then critiquing the clan politics approach. Next, the paper sets out a two part conceptual framework which first uses neopatrimonialism as a broader analytical framework to understand informal political relations and behaviour and their relationship with formal institutions. The second part then explores the role of uncertainty during transition and the contingency of actors’ decision-making as factors influencing the application of informal political behaviour. The article proceeds by applying this dual framework to the empirical case of early post-Soviet Kazakhstan (1991-1995). It presents three sections to illustrate the importance of contingency and actor interest and choice in the emergence of informal political behaviour and relations. Taken together, these sections demonstrate how institutional competition, pluralism and electoral competition established a degree of uncertainty within the political system which Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, sought to stabilize by using informal forms of politics. The findings illustrate how informal politics can emerge vis-à-vis the uncertainty of transition, how they have a complex and inter-meshed relationship with formal political institutions and how they are important in analysing non-democratic transitions.




Current approaches to informal politics in the former Soviet Union

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, many scholars interested in the political and state building dimensions of the transition from Soviet rule focused on the development of formal institutions and the effects of formal institutional choice.​[3]​ However, early on in post-Soviet scholarship it became apparent that formal institutions did not adequately explain the political and economic transformation taking place across the former post-Soviet region and the nature and dynamics of power relations.​[4]​ In many former Soviet states formal institutions like constitutions, elections and parties were not the arenas where political competition, power and resources were truly decided. Rather it became apparent that informal politics, in the shape of informal institutions, organizations, norms and practices went some way to explaining political and economic development.​[5]​ Dissatisfied with the emphasis on formal institutional design, these scholars rightly indicated how informal institutions influenced ‘formal political participation by shaping modes of behaviour and attitudes at a stage prior to political participation as well as defining the risks and opportunities of action options’.​[6]​ It was observed that informal politics could help explain inconsistencies that have arisen in formal institutional design in varying cases.​[7]​ 

Nowhere has the role of informal politics been more evident than in post-Soviet Central Asia. In particular the work of Kathleen Collins and Edward Schatz, who devised the clan politics discourse, has shaped much of our understanding of how politics operates in post-Soviet Central Asian states and how authoritarian regimes emerge and consolidate.​[8]​ According to Collins, ‘clans are the critical informal organizations that we must conceptualise and theorise in order to understand politics in Central Asia’.​[9]​ Clan, in this particular literature is defined as ‘an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive kin identities’.​[10]​ They are the dominant social structures in the political system over and above formal institutions.​[11]​ The central idea behind clan politics is that political, economic and social relationships in the post-Soviet era are rooted in traditional kinship and familial relations and identities. The overarching assumption of this literature is that Soviet power failed in establishing hegemony over the traditional forms of identities and politics that had persisted in Central Asia for centuries before Russian domination. Whereas in other parts of the Soviet Union the Soviet elite were relatively successful in creating a sense of nationalism within republics, thus being one of the instrumental drivers for the erosion and collapse of the Soviet Union, in Central Asia tribal and clan loyalties persisted over Soviet constructed identities and boundaries.​[12]​ Instead, in Central Asia during both the Tsarist and Soviet period what existed was a system of dual authority.​[13]​ On one level existed the administrative political power of the Russian and then Soviet governments and on the other the power of local tribes and kinship based networks. What characterized the Soviet period was a form of patrimonial communism where a regime ‘relies on vertical chains of dependence between leaders in the state and party apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive patronage and clientelist networks’.​[14]​ Political power is concentrated in either a small elite clique or an individual ruler with a tendency for establishing a cult of personality. Rationalization of bureaucracy is low as the elite clique penetrates the apparatus through nepotistic appointments.

Therefore, during the Soviet period communist policies became fused with informal tribal and clan relations. For instance, attempts by the Soviet regime to enforce socialism and eradicate clan influence failed. Collins in her work describes how the Soviet Kolkhoz system (collective farms) was co-opted by local clan networks which retained exclusive control, while the policy of Korenizatsiya (native cadre development)​[15]​ allowed native clan networks to remain in powerful positions and maintain responsibility for the allocation of resources.​[16]​ During the Brezhnev era the power of clan networks intensified as Moscow permitted a form of indirect rule which allowed for a longevity and hegemony of clan access to power and resources. This is reflected in the long service of First Secretaries of the regional communist parties in the Central Asian republics (see table 1.1).​[17]​ Accordingly, even though Soviet policies interacted with and shaped clan identities and informal networks, they were also responsible for reinforcing them.​[18]​ Clan politics therefore makes clear the relationship between Central Asia’s past and present. Tribal and clan identities have persisted overtime unmoved by the great Soviet project. The durability of such identities continue to impress and shape the political development of modern Central Asian states and are instrumental in explaining authoritarian regime trajectory.​[19]​

(Table 1.1 to be inserted here)

While a clan approach based on kinship is useful, it possesses some fundamental problems. First, it overstates the case for kinship-based clans. By focusing on the idea of kinship-based clans it fails to respond to other forms of linkages such as community oriented networks as illustrated by Scott Radnitz in his research regarding the political uprising in Aksy in Kyrgyzstan in 2002. In his research Radnitz illustrates how political mobilization, which began after the politically motivated arrest of a local MP, was not organized specifically on kinship based clan divisions but on wider community networks which cut across tribal and clan identities.​[20]​ Therefore, a focus on kinship-based clans overlooks some of the subtle complexities occurring in Central Asian politics. It creates a tendency to view and describe Central Asian countries as ‘traditional societies’. Consequently, the approach suffers from orientalist overtones which are not conducive to our understanding of the region.

Second, and tellingly, the term ‘clan’ is not utilized by scholars in the region who instead prefer to use the terms ‘influence group’ and ‘lobby group’.​[21]​ The reasoning behind this is that ‘economics and not tribal loyalty’ are central to factional political competition.​[22]​ Indeed there is a distinction between the idea of ‘clan’ as a factional economic and clientelistic group, and clan as a tribal group based on kinship. The two are not the same, as Collins herself makes clear.​[23]​ However, evident in the literature is a tendency to overemphasize kinship and blood ties as driving informal politics and thus formal political processes and authoritarian development. As Kazakh political scientist Nurbulat Masanov has argued, tribal kinship based groupings are not ‘functional organizational structures such as existed in medieval Scotland and still exist in some African and Asian countries…[rather they] are more a way of thinking, a way of interpreting ongoing processes through the prism of the genealogy of the individual or group.’​[24]​ Not only, therefore, does clan not have to be attached specifically to the idea of ‘tribal and kinship based networks’ but also it suggests that kinship based identity is not a major organizational and functional factor. Therefore, in Kazakhstan, while we can make the distinction between kinship based networks (those of President Nazarbayev’s family) and general clientelistic networks (for example, the power to appoint many state officials), kinship is not the instrumental factor, and rather it is the economic resources such groups possess.​[25]​ The phenomena of clan politics reflects a wider degree of political and economic factionalism that has arisen through the extractive policies of the centre.​[26]​ Factionalism occurs, therefore, not necessarily based on kinship identities and familial relations, but rather on a broader variance of factors, most notably economic cleavages and community based networks.​[27]​ 

Third, the clan politics perspective also has a problem of accounting for political change. The propensity to view political competition and development through kinship bonds and familial ties is static and deterministic. Authors such as Schatz have recognized the problematic nature of accounting for change – but still tend to view informal politics within modern Central Asian politics as part of a ‘vicious cycle’.​[28]​ While Collins suggests clans are adaptable and able to persist in changing environments, the overall focus on familial ties and kinship based identities underlies the stress placed on clans, and the informal practices inherent within them, as a consequence of tradition and path dependent cultural legacies.​[29]​ This leads to a significant problem when attempting to explain recent events. For instance, since 2007 there has been a considerable decline in the influence and power of key Nazarbayev family members. The president’s son-in-law Rakhat Aliev and daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva have recently found themselves politically marginalized when previously they held significant power and influence.​[30]​ Nazarbayev moved against them due to their growing independent political power. Therefore, clan politics as an approach cannot account for political change due to its fixation on kinship as an explanation for political development. The clan politics approach also lacks a connection with the institutional processes which produce and shape informal organizations and practices. Within the clan politics literature, kinship-based clan politics are viewed as impacting and influencing formal political structures with little recompense.​[31]​ This emphasis, however, does not enlighten us as to how factors external to informal practices and organizations (newly emerging formal institutions for instance) might influence either the emergence of, or the continuation of, informal political phenomena.    

In response to the above shortcomings of the clan politics literature, this article, then, applies a dual analytical framework to understand informal political phenomena and explain their appearance. First, it uses neopatrimonialism as a conceptual lens to make sense of the inter-meshed relationship between informal politics and formal institutions in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Second, it places an emphasis on the role of contingency, the dynamism of transition (the manifestation of new institutions and political processes) and actor interest and choice (the preservation of political power) in explaining the emergence of informal political phenomena in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. This dual analytical framework is posited as a more adequate explanatory framework to the clan politics approach which places an overemphasis on the cultural path-dependent phenomena of kinship-based clans as an explanation for the prevalence of informal political phenomena in the post-Soviet era. This two-part analytical framework is examined and discussed in the next two sections, before applying it to the case-study of Kazakhstan.


Informal political relations and behaviour, and neopatrimonialism
Informal politics relations and behaviour occur in different forms and making sense of their emergence, their importance in political transition and their relationship with formal institutions requires analytical clarity. The following section seeks to achieve this by conceptually clarifying informal politics and defining and outlining the utility of neopatrimonialism as an analytical guide to understand informal political phenomena in post-Soviet Central Asia. 
 
There is a distinction between informal practices (patronage, vote rigging and selective application of formal rules) and informal organizations (factional networks).​[32]​ Both, however, are part of a much larger process regarding the role of informal politics. Informal political behaviour such as patronage and the selective application of formal rules by loyal officials to benefit a client are utilized to benefit the interests of informal clan networks, themselves clientelistic networks featuring a series of dyadic patron-client relations. Therefore, informal political behaviour and informal organizations are inextricably linked. It makes, sense, then, to conceptualize the phenomena of factional clan networks and the informal political behaviour from which they benefit from within a more cohesive unified framework. This can be achieved through two means. In the first instance, this article will apply the term ‘informal political behaviour and relations’ to refer to the wider interlinked phenomena between informal organizations and practices.​[33]​ Second, it is suggested that the relationship between informal organizations, informal practices and formal institutions makes greater sense when examined through the analytical lens of neopatrimonialism as opposed to the narrower framework of kinship based clan politics. 

As an analytical framework, neopatrimonialism has taken on varied definitions and meanings creating methodological problems with its application.​[34]​ However, there are several broad commonalities among its varied interpretations. The concept derives from the Weberian notion of pre-bureaucratic patriarchal domination where power ‘is based not on the officials’ commitment to an impersonal purpose and not on obedience to abstract norms, but on strict personal loyalty.’​[35]​ Neopatrimonialism consists of ‘traditional’ patrimonial elements of political rule such as personal rulership, loyalty to the leader, patronage and patron-client networks and inter-elite factional conflict over access to resources.

Neopatrimonialism, however, is defined not solely on personalistic characteristics.​[36]​ Rather, neopatrimonialism illustrates that ‘customs and patterns or patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, legal-rational institutions’.​[37]​ The two distinct levels within neopatrimonialism, therefore, are the informal (personalism of office, patron-client relations and factional conflict) and the rational–legal (formally defined spheres of bureaucracy and liberal-constitutional frameworks). Therefore, the characteristic feature of neopatrimonialism is the incorporation of patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions.​[38]​ 

Conceptualizing informal politics through the lens of neopatrimonialism is significant in several ways. It stresses the key role played by vestiges of traditionalism and informal politics in newly emerging modern bureaucratic regimes. This is particularly salient to post-Soviet Central Asia allowing scholars to make greater sense of the relationship that exists between informal political relations and behaviour and formal political institutions in the region. In this article, neopatrimonialism is used as an analytical framework through which to view the relationship between legal-rational formal institutions (impersonal rationally defined spheres of bureaucratic office, liberal-constitutional frameworks) and informal patrimonial political phenomena (personalism of office, patronage and patron-client relations and factional elite conflict). It assists in charting and observing the relationship between aspects of patrimonial rule (as highlighted above) and new formal institutions (parliament, presidency, elections etc.) which have emerged in post-Soviet states and how informal politics materialize and are used in conjunction with formal institutions.

The post-Soviet transition has seen states develop a complex web of informal political relations and behaviour and formal institutions which are inter-meshed. The formal is not neatly separated from the informal and as this article illustrates informal political behaviour (the use of patronage) was used to assist the consolidation of formal political power in the case of President Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. This is why neopatrimonialism is useful as a conceptual lens in the case of Central Asia, as the formal and informal co-exist within the states’ political systems.  Neopatrimonialism, thus, is employed to guide and focus analysis on the relationship between the formal and informal. While all Central Asian states have the formal components of modern democratic statehood, that is written constitutions, separation of powers, multi-partism​[39]​ and elections; they also possess the irrational personalism of office, excessive loyalty to the leader, embedded patron-client networks and factional clientelistic elite conflict.​[40]​ Presidential leadership in Central Asia is synonymous with personal leadership. Whether it was the leadership cult of Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan, or the iron leadership of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, Central Asian presidents have aimed to preserve power using informal political relations and behaviour. The question that arises, then, is what incentivizes political actors to build authoritarian political regimes featuring a high proportion of informal norms? Is it driven predominantly by cultural legacies as suggested in the clan politics literature? Alternatively, can an explanation be found in the uncertain, contingent and dynamic context of transition?

Contingency and the dynamics of transition: actors’ interests and ideologies

While cultural legacies are certainly important in exploring the relationship between informal and formal politics in the post-Soviet context,​[41]​ they do not address the differing degrees of influence of the formal and informal in different policy areas or in different parts of the Soviet world.​[42]​ Rather political actors’ interests, decisions and information available to them can assist in explaining the high proportion of informal relations and behaviour.​[43]​ Critical junctures in history often disrupt a prior institutional equilibrium where political actors are certain of institutional effects and can calculate their interests in relation to expected outcomes.​[44]​ Institutional change creates an uncertain and dynamic transitional context where institutional effects are unknown impacting, in turn, on actors’ perceived interests. As Vladimir Gelman has argued, informal political norms are ‘a useful method to bypass imperfect and/or new formal institutions.’​[45]​ Sometimes they are ‘created intentionally by deliberate omissions or ambiguity within the framework of new formal institutions’.​[46]​ Therefore, while cultural and historical legacies have to be taken into account, the heightened sense of uncertainty in an institutional capacity concerning actors’ interests requires consideration. The uncertainty of newly emerging political processes (such as heightened institutional conflict, emerging pluralism and electoral competition) leads to a degree of contingency centred on strategic choices with which political actors are faced. The role of agency interest has a deep history in the process of regime transition. Actors are viewed as making a conscious decision to ‘craft’ pacts and accept limitations to their perceived interests and preferences in an effort to establish equilibrium in a new institutional context.​[47]​

While it is clear that tribes and clans have been persistent temporal features, such a view fails to account for the fusion of actors and institutions that occur at critical temporal junctures.​[48]​ Just as the change from nomadic tribal political organization to Soviet rule engendered a fusion between traditional politics and Soviet bureaucracy in the shape of patrimonial communism, the uncertain context of post-Soviet transition elicited further fusion between different types of informal political behaviour and formal institutions. Viewing kinship identities as the central factor which accounts for the emergence of informal politics underestimates the power of context and the dynamism of transition. Cultural legacies do not solely explain the overwhelming appearance of informal forms of political relations and behaviour in post-Soviet Central Asia and such a static interpretation of informal political phenomena does not account for political change. In times of flux and transition political actors generally seek to minimize political costs and in doing so reach for the most appropriate tools at their disposal. In the case of post-Soviet Central Asia, political actors have relied on prior experiences from the communist period to understand and interpret political competition, which remained a blend between informal clan and tribal identities and communist bureaucratic tendencies. At the critical juncture of transition, additional competing institutions and interests emerged and in these conditions political actors turned to informal politics as a way to minimize the costs of transition on their perceived political power. All Central Asian states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union with new constitutional-liberal institutions and legal-rational bureaucracies.​[49]​ While many of these new institutions are not comparable to similar institutions as understood in Western democracies, and even though incumbent elites played a part in their establishment, these new institutions whether in the form of elections, parties, new constitutions or a new free-market environment, established a structural environment which was dynamic and uncertain for political actors. Within this fluctuating context actors had to recalculate their perceived interests and adjust strategies to deal with them and re-establish institutional equilibrium. 

The strategies used by political actors in the region varied from country to country. In Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov maintained a tight control of any new emerging institutions by not permitting multipartism, minimizing the cost of pluralism through limited electoral competition and creating a personality cult around his leadership.​[50]​ In Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev initially allowed the dynamism of transition to flourish. He instituted a credible form of pluralism and significant aspects of a liberal market economy to such an extent the country became known as Central Asia’s ‘Island of Democracy’.​[51]​ Akaev was originally a beneficiary of the new political institutions and processes which emerged during glasnost. He was unexpectedly elected to the newly created post of President of the Kyrgyz Republic by the Supreme Soviet in October 1990.  In Tajikistan the trajectory was different. The country collapsed into civil war as key political actors could not find a way to re-establish the institutional equilibrium of the Soviet period.​[52]​ 

In many of these cases, political actors turned to informal forms of political behaviour and relations to re-assert their position vis-à-vis the uncertain institutional context of transition.​[53]​ The choice of presidentialism for many Soviet republics led to an excessive personalism of the office.​[54]​ Presidentialism was a popular choice for actors in the former Soviet Union due to its propensity for the centralization of power. Additionally, it enabled many former Communist Party First Secretaries to retain office and power before and after the Soviet Union collapsed. This was particularly the case with the Central Asian states, where many First Secretaries emerged as the first presidents of the independent republics. The use of presidential patronage in exchange for political loyalty insured presidential actors against institutional competition which threatened their grip on power. Thus, informal political relations and behaviour were utilized due to the dynamic and uncertain context of transition and not just because of path dependent cultural legacies. 

In the case of Kazakhstan below, to which we now turn to as a case-study, informal political relations and behaviour were used to consolidate authoritarian rule at the expense of emerging democratic institutions. Three inter-linked key political processes (institutional conflict, emerging pluralism and electoral competition) will be assessed to exemplify the degree of uncertainty that the Kazakh president was under, and how he turned to informal political norms of behaviour and relations in an effort to secure himself from institutional uncertainty.​[55]​ These three processes are illustrative of how in transition formal institutions emerge which challenge the pre-existing institutional order and create uncertainty for political actors. Political actors make the decision to utilize informal politics to stabilize and consolidate their rule. The findings of the case study illustrate the fit of the analytical framework as informal political behaviour and relations are inter-meshed with formal institutions (neopatrimonialism) with political actors (actor choice) utilizing informal politics to mitigate the uncertainty of transition.

Informal and Formal Politics and Uncertainty in Kazakhstan’s Early Transition 1990-1995

Independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 brought significant challenges to the president of Kazakhstan. Nursultan Nazarbayev had been the First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party and a protégé of Dinmukhammed Kunaev (the long-standing leader of the Kazakh Socialist Soviet Republic from the 1960s until the 1980s). While Nazarbayev’s move from First Secretary to President was on the surface seamless, the multi-natured dynamics of Kazakhstan’s early independence period created a degree of uncertainty in relation to power and authority. Three broad processes arose to unsettle the previous Soviet stability; institutional competition, a degree of emerging pluralism and electoral competition. In responding to these challenges, Nazarbayev turned to informal politics to maintain control and secure a new institutional equilibrium which consolidated his grip on power at the expense of the emergence of genuine democratic institutions. We examine these three processes in turn.

Institutional conflict and competition 
Kazakhstan’s original constitution, introduced in January 1993, encapsulated the degree of institutional uncertainty apparent in the political system. This uncertainty, as in other post-Soviet republics, manifested institutional competition between the president and the parliament. The constitution invested considerable powers in the presidency as parliament lacked the power to impeach.​[56]​ Nevertheless, the constitution also enshrined a parliamentary-presidential form of government​[57]​ where the president lacked powers of dissolution and the parliament ‘enjoyed a wide range of formal rights including the right to approve the budget, amend the constitution and elect the constitutional court.’​[58]​ The Supreme Soviet emerged as a body responsible for pivotal and important decisions. Between its inception in April 1990 until its self-dissolution in October 1993 the Twelfth Convocation approved and introduced the post of president (24 April 1990), declared state sovereignty (25 October 1990), the Constitutional Law on State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan (16 December 1991) and the first constitution of independent Kazakhstan.​[59]​ According to its former chairman, Serikbolsyn Abdil’din, the body was now ‘radically different from the traditional role it played during the Soviet period, as it was now the original creator of laws.’​[60]​

The parliament consisted of representatives of entrenched interests from former communist organizations, state enterprises and institutions.​[61]​ A new parliament was to be established under the 1993 constitution: the unicameral Supreme Kenges. However, the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, under the leadership of Abdil’din, were unwilling to cede power and call elections for the new body immediately. Parliament instead was beginning to ‘serve as a magnate for growing popular disenchantment with the failing economy’, becoming the chief opponent of the president’s economic reform program.​[62]​ Driven primarily by Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s early post-Soviet economic policy was influenced by the economic trends in Russia and was concerned mainly with maintaining close economic ties with its former patron.​[63]​ Similar to Russia, Nazarbayev’s reform and destatification agenda included price liberalization, liberalization of the consumer market, a privatization program and the reconstruction of the country’s economic infrastructure. ​[64]​ All of this was underpinned by the signing of huge deals with foreign companies regarding the oil deposits in the Tengiz oil field in Western Kazakhstan and an IMF backed stabilization program.​[65]​ The de-statification program and the sell-off of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas deposits to foreign companies met considerable resistance in parliament.

In 1993, led by Abdil’din many deputies in the Supreme Soviet opposed the reform agenda fearing displacement from stakes they possessed in state enterprises and other organizations. Subsequently, economic reform stalled. Nazarbayev, concerned Kazakhstan was now lagging behind Russia as well as feeling threatened by the constitutional power of parliament, invited deputies to dissolve the parliament on the basis that there had not yet been a democratic election for the body and thus their legitimacy was under question. Parliament eventually acquiesced, but only through a process of informal deal making which appropriately rewarded deputies. Sally Cummings notes that Nazarbayev struck a deal with the deputies, as the president decreed their status and income.​[66]​ Indeed Abdil’din himself has noted how the president used informal techniques of persuasion. He suggests the president twisted the arms of those deputies who worked in state organizations and within the state apparatus by offering them re-election or a new post.​[67]​ Such informal bargaining illustrates the powers of patronage that was at the president’s disposal resembled those commonly found in neopatrimonial regimes. Moreover, it demonstrates how the president turned to relying on such informal powers of patronage due to the institutional competition which had arisen between the legislative and executive branch. Institutional conflict produced an uncertain and dynamic context where the president’s ability to see his preferences (economic reform) enacted was compromised and his political position de-stabilized. He turned to the informal behaviour of patronage to counter the cost of this institutional conflict. The use of informal persuasion to coerce loyalty began the president’s deep dependence on informal political behaviour and relations to centralize powers in his presidency. With the dissolution of parliament Nazarbayev was invested with plenipotentiary powers until new elections were held. These events began the formal concentration of power in Nazarbayev’s presidency which was to have a significant impact on institutional consolidation and the weakening of nascent democratic institutions. 

Emerging Pluralism 
Another dynamic process of transition was the emergence of pluralism in the guise of new political parties and organizations. In Kazakhstan during the new era of openness between 1986-1989 there was a surfacing of informal political movements and discussion clubs.​[68]​ The earliest of these organizations centred on ecological issues as disparate groups appeared across Kazakhstan concerned with confronting the ecological problems facing the country.​[69]​ This included a patchwork of independent groups in Alma-Ata called Zelenyi Front (Green Front) ​[70]​ and the famous and popular Nevada-Semipalatinsk International Anti-nuclear and Ecological Movement. The emergence of such pluralism was connected to events occurring at the centre. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was undertaking a process of gradual de-centralization of power. Therefore, in many of the former Soviet republics the ability for new political movements and parties to emerge was as a direct response to Gorbachev’s policies of reform in Moscow. Comparatively Kazakhstan lagged behind many of the other Soviet republics (especially the Baltic republics and Russia) in terms of greater demokratizatsiya (democratization). However, the process of change and reform did eventually reach the southern states of the former Soviet Union.

The decision in Moscow in March 1990 to remove the Communist Party’s constitutional right to be the only political party in the Soviet Union further exacerbated the trend towards plurality of ideas and interests existing in the public realm. In Kazakhstan, although small in membership, parties were founded on strong principles, ideological beliefs and particular ethnic and national interests.​[71]​ In an effort to get a handle on the emergence of a plurality of parties Nazarbayev sought to control this process by establishing his own personal political party. In September 1991, at the final extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK), Nazarbayev pushed for the dissolution of the party and the establishment of a reformist Socialist Party of Kazakhstan (SPK).​[72]​ A hardcore of KPK members continued as a party positioning themselves in opposition to the president. The president reacted by refusing the KPK registration and stripping them of their assets, thus ensuring they could not compete in any elections. The SPK was a reaction to the development of competition from other political institutions and organizations, as the president sought to create a party in which he could use as an instrument that would be loyal to his political requirements. SPK, however, proved to be neither acquiescent to Nazarbayev’s rule nor committed to a strong presidential republic. By 1993, the party withdrew its support for him and moved into opposition. Unable to rely on the support of the SPK, Nazarbayev ordained the creation of another broad based pro-presidential party, the Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (SNEK). The party was committed to supporting Nazarbayev’s policies. SNEK advocated the dissolution of parliament in December 1993 and supported the president’s bid for a strong presidential system. SNEK was to all intent and purpose the president’s party and was the forerunner to the now dominant Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland).  

Added to the emerging melting pot of parties and organizations was the Party of People’s Congress of Kazakhstan (NKK). The party was created by the leaders of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement and was headed by Olzhas Suleimenov, a famous Kazakh poet and writer and Mukhtar Shakanov, also a writer.​[73]​ Set up in October 1991 the party was initially supported by the authorities. A split in the leadership, however, left Suleimenov in sole charge and the party shifted to what they termed ‘constructive opposition’. NKK had considerable financial support from influential sponsors and private businesses. Suleimenov effectively became the head of the Kazakh opposition during 1993-94 and there was great pressure on him to challenge Nazarbayev for the prospective presidential elections in 1996.​[74]​ Using informal bargaining to establish a patron-client relationship, Nazarbayev struck a deal with Suleimenov that saw him appointed the Kazakh ambassador to Italy.​[75]​ This secured not only loyalty to the president from his chief opponent, but it also meant he would not confront a potentially popular candidate in the presidential election. 

The nature of emerging pluralism during this very early period of Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet development (from 1989-1995) illustrates two types of political parties were emerging. There were those who formed parties under the personal tutelage of the president (SNEK and originally SPK) and those that were autonomous (KPK, NKK and other smaller parties). However, autonomous parties that posed a threat were kept out of competing for power altogether (as in the case of the KPK) or were co-opted by the presidential administration by offering rewards in exchange for loyalty (as in the case of NKK). It points to a phenomenon common within the post-Soviet context in that pluralism and the development of political parties created an uncertain dynamic context unsettling the previous one party domination. Political actors such as Nazarbayev reacted against this new institutional environment by seeking to manage and control the situation to reflect his political interests which principally was to ensure and consolidate his political rule. It was not permissible to have autonomous parties and groups provoking institutional conflict and proselytizing an alternative discourse as this created uncertainty and instability for those in power. Therefore, pluralism had to be controlled from above through the creation of a personal political pro-presidential party (as in SNEK) which is illustrative of the personalization of politics in neopatrimonial systems, through cooption and the establishment of a patron-client relationship (as in NKK) and through criminalization (as with the KPK). Informal forms of political relations and behaviour were employed to ensure party development from above would succeed whether through electoral manipulation (see below), in ensuring SNEK won the most seats in the legislative elections, or through offering rewards for loyalty, as in the cooption of Suleimenov.   

Electoral Competition and a Reprisal of Institutional Conflict
The third process adding to the sense of political uncertainty was electoral competition. Electoral competition is by its very nature a process which unleashes uncertainty and contingency within a political system and for political actors seeking to control political transition it represents a process which requires as much controlling as possible. Nazarbayev sought to control electoral competition through informal means. However, the uncertain nature of electoral competition led to further institutional conflict which the president used informal political relations to quell and re-establish dominance of the political system. For the first post-Soviet legislative election in March 1994, the president was allowed to appoint 42 deputies from a state list to the new 177 member Supreme Kenges. This power of patronage was intended to guarantee a dependable majority of support for Nazarbayev. Such patronage and the desire to ensure loyalty to his personal leadership within the parliament illustrate the neopatrimonial nature of Nazarbayev’s emerging regime. On the one hand the president was keen for formal liberal institutions (elections) to form part of the political system, but on the other hand such formal institutions had to be based on patrimonial relations (patronage and personalism). The process and conduct of the election was strictly controlled and the voting process closely stage-managed with formal rules selectively applied by loyal officials to preference pro-presidential parties, namely SNEK.​[76]​ On the surface the election result seemed to provide the president with a pliant and loyal majority with SNEK winning 30 seats to sit alongside the 42 state list candidates.​[77]​ However, despite using informal norms of political behaviour and relations to manage the outcome of the election (vote rigging, media bias and the banning of undesirable candidates and parties) it was not sufficient to guarantee the parliament would be subservient to presidential rule. There continued to be a large oppositional bloc within parliament (see table 1.2) focused on the SPK (who won 8 seats and 15 percent of the vote), the NKK (9 seats and 13 percent of the votes) and ancillary Communist Party organizations such as the Peasants Union and Profsoiuz (which together received 17 percent of the vote and 15 seats).

(Table 1.2 to be inserted here) 


Despite the loyal bloc of support for the president in parliament, the opposition demonstrated strength and resolve against some of the president’s policies. It is believed that, including the independents, the opposition to Nazarbayev consisted of roughly thirty percent of deputies. However, with the country suffering considerable economic and social difficulties many supposedly loyal deputies were ‘often opposed to those measures which were imposed on people by the central authorities’.​[78]​ The uncertainty of electoral competition, despite attempts to manage it through the use of the state list and administrative resources to support pro-presidential parties, had thrown up further institutional conflict between the parliament and the president. In the first instance, the parliament was unwilling to elect the president’s favoured candidate for parliamentary speaker, Kuanish Sultanov.​[79]​  Furthermore, the privatization program under the leadership of Prime Minister Sergei Tereshchenko also met steep resistance. Buoyed by public opinion that ran strongly against privatization, the opposition was determined to halt economic reform. In May 1994, the opposition led by NKK passed a vote of no confidence in Tereshchenko’s government by 111 to 28 votes.​[80]​ Claiming there was no constitutional basis for the government to resign, Tereshchenko kept his position but the opposition continued their sustained pressure by overriding the presidential veto on two consumer protection bills in July 1994.​[81]​ By now the legislature had become what Olcott describes as a ‘bully pit’ where the floor was used to air concerns over Nazarbayev’s leadership and policy program.​[82]​ Reports of opposition deputies’ speeches and criticisms of the president were published in independent media outlets and even state newspapers such as Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. By October 1994, Tereshchenko’s resignation was eventually accepted and conflict between the ever-vocal legislature and the president seemed to be approaching boiling point. 

Political competition in Kazakhstan reflected along institutional lines during this period due to parliament still retaining a significant degree of constitutional power. The lack of equilibrium between the two institutional centres of power created conflict and uncertainty. The explanation for the intensification of opposition after the 1994 election can be linked to the dynamic and changing nature of transition politics. According to Olcott, ‘the patronage of the president was seemingly limitless…but those who lacked personal ties to the leader were also freer to follow their own political instincts’.​[83]​ Therefore, the old elite began to divide ‘into those who felt advantaged by the new political and economic world and those who did not’.​[84]​ From this perspective, it was principally those not privy to the benefits of transition politics that emerged as the main opposition in parliament. 

As noted above, opposition from parliament was acting as a roadblock to Nazarbayev’s ability to see his decisions enacted. Without a loyal parliament willing to rubber stamp his decisions and ensure his privatization programme was passed, and as long as parliament retained a degree of power over the executive branch, there was no guarantee Nazarbayev’s position was stable. Unable to counter the opposition from parliament and stabilize his rule the president needed to extend his constitutional powers at the expense of the legislative branch. However, there was little chance of being able to achieve this with the convocation elected in the 1994 parliamentary election. As with the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in December 1993, Nazarbayev once again relied on his informal power of patronage to dissolve the legislature affording him the opportunity to re-draw the constitutional framework of the country. 

The dissolution of parliament was achieved through the backdoor. In March 1995, a failed candidate from the Abylaikhanov electoral district in Almaty, Tatiana Kvyatkovskaya, filed a complaint to the Constitutional Court arguing the electoral districts for the 1994 election were disproportionate resulting in deputies representing vastly different size constituencies. On the 8 March 1995 the court ruled in her favour and annulled not only the result for the Abylaikhanov district but the whole election too, stating ‘the Central Election Commission had broken article 60 of the constitution.’​[85]​  Despite clever political protests regarding the decision on behalf of the president, seemingly indicating that the country’s leader was bowing to the independent decision of the court, in actuality the dissolution was of a clear political advantage to Nazarbayev. The fate of those involved demonstrates how patronage was used to make certain the president got this desired result. The main players found themselves well rewarded for their services. Kvyatkovskaya went on to head the pro-presidential Otan (Fatherland) party list in the 1999 parliamentary election and served as a deputy. Kairbek Suleimenov, a deputy minister of Internal Affairs, was close to many of the judges on the court and was reported to have been influential in their final decision. After the dissolution of parliament Suleimenov was soon promoted to Minister of the Interior.​[86]​ Furthermore, even though some parliamentarians resisted the dissolution by staging protests with a few even engaging in a hunger strike, the president rewarded loyal deputies who went way quietly by setting up a special commission in order to find employment for them.​[87]​ It represents a further illustration of Nazarbayev’s tendency for patronage in exchange for loyalty.

After the dissolution of parliament Nazarbayev consolidated his power in formal institutional terms by establishing a new constitution (1995) which granted significant personal power to the president at the expense of the legislature. From this point onwards Kazakhstan moved away from democratization to a form of durable authoritarianism. The uncertainty inherent in these political processes at this time led to an imbalance in the previous institutional equilibrium which threatened the power of President Nazarbayev. It was his path-contingent choice to utilize informal political behaviour (typically in this case patronage and personalism of office) as a means to stabilize his political position. The consequence of this action was not just the consolidation of authoritarian rule in Kazakhstan based on patrimonial relations, but also the formal institutionalization of his personal power (through a new constitution) by the use of informal political relations and behaviour. As such it demonstrates the way in which the informal and formal interconnect and relate in post-Soviet neopatrimonial political systems. 

Conclusion 
The clan politics approach with its central focus on kinship based identities and its culturally determinist explanation for the appearance and dominance of informal politics is an unsatisfying approach to the study of post-Soviet Central Asian politics due to its difficulty in accounting for political change,  and unwillingness to factor in other reasons for the emergence of informal politics. Instead, this article has used a dual framework of neopatrimonialism and an actor oriented approach in an effort to account for the emergence of informal politics, political change, and to emphasize the complex relationship between informal politics and formal institutions in post-Soviet Central Asia. By focusing on the uncertainty new formal institutions bring to political transition, it is possible to observe how political actors attempt to mitigate institutional uncertainty by using informal political relations and behaviour to stabilize and then consolidate their rule. In this article this dual approach has been applied to the case of the early transition period of post-Soviet Kazakhstan.  

This article has illustrated how in the case of Kazakhstan informal political behaviour and relations allowed the president to negotiate the institutional uncertainty of the early transition period to stabilize his political rule. The contingency of the president’s decision-making placed the country on a path to durable authoritarianism and not democracy. As opposed to the dominant literature on Central Asia which argues that the emergence of such informal political phenomena (namely clientelism, patronage and factional conflict) is linked to path dependent cultural legacies bound by kinship identity, this article has suggested that informal politics in the case of Kazakhstan emerged in response to the uncertainty of transition. Informal political relations and behaviour emerged in response to the lack of institutional equilibrium derived from the uncertain and dynamic context of transition from Soviet to independent Republic. The analysis illustrated how formal institutions (the presidency, parliament and the new constitution) are inter-meshed with informal political behaviour and relations (patronage and patron-client relationships) as conceived in neopatrimonial systems. It demonstrates how neopatrimonialism can analytically assist scholars in unpacking aspects of the complex relationship between informal political relations and behaviour and formal institutional development in post-Soviet Central Asia. 

The uncertainty of the period between 1991 and 1995 created instability for Nazarbayev’s position. To overcome this uncertainty Nazarbayev used informal political relations and behaviour. Both the 1993 and 1995 dissolution of the legislature came about through informal backroom deals and the use of rewards in exchange for loyalty. The emergence of political opposition in the form of pluralism was also managed either from above with the creation of loyal presidential parties based on personalism or through cooption based on patronage where loyalty was bought in exchange for rewards. The case of Kazakhstan illustrates how informal political norms were an important factor in the early post-Soviet transition period and have continued to shape the development of formal legal-rational institutions while simultaneously hindering democratization in the region. 

The three processes of institutional competition, emerging pluralism and electoral competition were a product of transition from communist rule. In the case of Kazakhstan informal political behaviour and relations were used to shape and determine a new institutional order which situated power in the person of Nazarbayev post the 1995 dissolution of parliament. A closer examination of this period highlights two key points.  First, the issue of uncertainty and contingency in shaping post-Soviet transitions, and conceivably in any transition directed towards democratization, requires closer inspection. The uncertainty and dynamism of early transition periods can assist in explaining why states take divergent paths. Aside from the contingent nature of process, it is the choices that actors make in relation to uncertain conditions which can shape transition paths and account for why some states achieve democratic outcomes while others do not. Second, this period in the case of Kazakhstan has illustrated how the study of informal political relations (informal practices) and informal organizations (factional networks) and their relationship with new formal institutions are central to understanding the political and economic development of post-Soviet states and the failure to consolidate democratic systems in this region of the world.
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